

Proposal:

The Global Leadership Project

Principal Investigators:

John Gerring

Dept of Political Science
Boston University
232 Bay State Road
Boston MA 02215
kgerring@bu.edu
(corresponding author)

Erzen Oncel

Dept of Political Science
Boston University
232 Bay State Road
Boston MA 02215
erzeno@bu.edu

Philip Keefer

Development Research Group
The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
pkeefer@worldbank.org

Kevin Morrison

Dept of Government
Cornell University
White Hall 315
Ithaca, NY 14853
morrison@cornell.edu

The Global Leadership Project (GLP) sheds light on problems of governance by collecting information about the attributes of leaders around the world, recorded at the individual level. Leaders (aka elites) include legislators, members of the executive branch, members of the judiciary, and other decision makers whose power may be formal or informal. Data, collected through an extensive questionnaire, will cover every sizeable country in the world – a total of 170 sovereign and semi-sovereign nation-states at the present time. When completed, the dataset will encompass roughly 40,000 leaders, each of which is coded along 32 parameters, producing approximately 1.3 million matrix cells.

GLP is the only comprehensive dataset containing individual-level information on political elites across the world. It is likely to serve as a fundamental resource for policymakers, researchers, and citizens as it provides the basis for accurate and precise comparisons within countries, across countries, and across regions. (Eventually, if the project is continued, it will also allow for comparisons through time.)

In this proposal we discuss the motivation for GLP, the core elements of the project, its current status, and future development.

Background

The importance of individual leaders for development has long been emphasized by donors (who look for “windows of opportunity” that tend to be defined by the reform commitment of their government counterparts) and by scholars (e.g., Jones and Olken 2005, who find that individual leaders matter for growth). Moreover, a growing literature (e.g., Besley and Reynal Querol 2011) emphasizes that leaders differ markedly with regard to characteristics (e.g., levels of education) that might affect their willingness or capacity to embrace and implement development-oriented reform. In spite of the emphasis given to the qualities of leaders – at least implicitly – in donor discussions and in the academic literature, there is very little data from which we can make systematic inferences regarding the development impact of those qualities. This project has already succeeded in coding 96 countries. In this proposal, we seek funds for the remaining 74 countries in our target sample.

While individual-level data is taken for granted in studying behavior at the mass level (e.g., markets, elections, public opinion) – and crossnational polls such as the World Values Survey and various “Barometer” surveys now collect this information systematically on a global scale – the behavior of governments is still approached primarily at the system-level (the state) or at the level of component organizations (the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, an agency, political parties, and so forth). Where individual-level data is exploited it has usually been limited to a single country or a small set of countries (e.g., Bunce 1981; Elgie 1995; Mouritzen, Svava 2002; Riker 1986; Roeder 1985; Samatar 1997; Samuels 2003), to public organizations within a country (Barnard 1938; Blau 1955; Enticott, et al. 2008; Selznick 1957), to villages and communities (Chattopadhyay, Duflo 2004), or small-group settings (Humphreys et al. 2006).

Recently, this has begun to change. Information about heads of state around the world over the past several centuries has been compiled in Goemans et al. (2009), Horowitz and Stam (2010), Rulers.org, and Worldstatesmen.org, while *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, a CIA publication (on-line at www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/index.html) includes current heads of state and cabinet members (no historical data). This kind of data has been used for descriptive inference (most recently by Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011 to demonstrate that democracies elect more educated leaders); to generate independent variables (such as Jones and Olken 2005, who find in a contemporary global sample of countries that leaders matter for economic growth and that they matter more for some policies, like monetary policy, and in some regimes, namely autocratic ones); and to generate dependent variables (e.g., the variety of work

studying leadership transition [Bienen and van de Walle 1991]).

However, systematic global studies of political leadership are generally limited to heads-of-state and thus offer extremely thin gruel for generalizing about the actions of governments. After all, even in highly authoritarian countries decisions are the product of more than one person's input. There is only so much one can say about the nature of a country's elite on the basis of a single individual's characteristics. For example, while the study by Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) demonstrates that leaders of the executive branch are more educated in democracies, is that reflective of the broader leadership in democracies and dictatorships? The answer to this question is clearly important, but we have no data with which to answer it.

A broader and fairly well-defined leadership class is represented in legislatures. With that notion in mind, background information on legislators has been collected in a systematic fashion for a handful of western democracies as part of the EurElite and SEDEPE projects.¹ This has fostered an impressive research agenda focused on ministers and parliamentarians and on questions related to recruitment, usually with a historical angle (e.g., Berlinski, et al. 2010; Best, Cotta 2000; Borchert, Zeiss 2004; Cotta, Best 2007; Dowding, Dumont 2009; Norris 1997). Unfortunately, data on legislators is limited to several dimensions (in accordance with the limited theoretical scope of these studies) and its format is not always standardized across surveys, limiting possibilities for cross-country comparison. None of these projects attempt to encompass the developing world.²

Faccio (2006) has constructed a database comprised of the names of legislators in forty-six countries (most located in the OECD). This is cross-tabulated with the names of top officers and shareholders of 20,202 listed companies covered in the Worldscope database, with the aim of measuring the political connections of firms, and thus allowing for firm-level, sector-level, and country-level analysis. An event history analysis attempts to determine the impact of these connections on companies' stock valuation by looking at the temporal correlation between share price and (a) the entry of a politician into a company as top officer or shareholder or (b) the entry of a top officer or shareholder into government. The analysis reveals no change in share-prices of consequence following (a) but a significant increase in share-prices following (b).

Systematic information about legislators for a much larger universe is collected in the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) database, PARLINE (www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp). However, this data pertains only to a few features of parliamentary life, i.e. the number of members, the distribution of seats among political parties, and the distribution of seats according to sex. Reynolds (2011) and Ruedin (2009), building on PARLINE, gather additional data on ethnic and gay/lesbian representation. Like PARLINE, these databases include only aggregate data (aggregated by legislative house), not individual-level data.

Recently, a database on cabinet ministers has been collected by Alexiadou (2011), who is studying when and why cabinet ministers matter for the economy. For 18 OECD parliamentary democracies, from 1945-2010, she has collected data on various characteristics of the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, as well as Ministers of Finance, Economics, Social Affairs, Health, Employment, and Foreign Affairs. The characteristics include education level, professional background, age, whether they have served in parliament previously, and their position in their party. With this data, Alexiadou argues that the personal characteristics of ministers affect the influence they have on policy. Despite being a clear improvement on our existing knowledge of ministers, this

¹ EurElite projects, including Datacube, are described at: www.eurElite.uni-jena.de/index.html. The Selection and Deselection of Political Elites (SEDEPE) project is described at: www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/sedepe/homepage.php

² Several features of SEDEPE are integrated into GLP so as to maintain commensurability across coding categories. However, the range of data collected by GLP is much greater than SEDEPE, so there is relatively little overlap between the two projects.

dataset is much more limited than GLP in terms of leaders within a country, country-coverage, and breadth of information about each leader.

This review of work on the quality of leaders yields two important conclusions. First, in areas where important work has taken place (e.g., with respect to the education, gender or ethnicity of leaders), data are partial both with respect to country coverage and to the fraction of country leaders for which data are available. Neither theory nor intuition tells us, for example, that the education of the executive is a good proxy for the education of all of the relevant leaders of a country. Similarly, neither theory nor intuition tells us that the effects of leader education in richer countries are the same in poorer countries. Second, in many other areas where there is a consensus on the importance of leadership qualities (e.g., with respect to the disciplinary background of leaders), there are simply no data available at all. This proposal will dramatically increase the number of leaders, the number of countries, and the number of leader characteristics for which we have comparable data.

Classifying Leaders/Elites

The notion of a leader or elite can be defined in various ways (Blondel 1987; Dogan 2003; Putnam 1976; Higley, Pakulski 2007). Our project recognizes ten categories: (1) the apex, (2) the top ten, (3) the executive, (4) cabinet members, (5) executive staff, (6) party leaders, (7) assembly leaders, (8) supreme court justices, (9) back-benchers, and (10) unelected persons. Some of these categories are defined in formal terms (statutory or constitutional) and others are informal. Note also that several of these categories are overlapping.

The *apex* of a polity consists of the one or two persons who possess the greatest overall political influence in a country. Their power may be formal or informal. It may include the executive(s), holders of the most powerful offices, or unelected persons (e.g., a media patron, religious leader, military leader). Coders are asked to decide whether a single person occupies the apex or whether two people of virtually equal power share this position of influence (as in China and in many semipresidential systems).

The *top ten* elites in a polity consist of the next most powerful persons, after those at the apex. Similar considerations apply (e.g., their power may be formal or informal). Next, we recognize a series of more or less formal positions that are often correlated with real political influence (though, obviously, to varying degrees in different countries), and which may overlap with the apex and the top ten. These include: *the executive*, *cabinet members*, *executive staff*, *party leaders*, *assembly leaders*, *supreme court justices* (understood as the top court, often a constitutional court), and *back-benchers* (assembly members without leadership positions).

A residual category of *unelected persons* encompasses figures such as a monarch, religious leader, military leader or junta who exert influence over a range of policy issues (not just a specialized issue-area). The breadth of influence is important here. For example, a central bank may be influential and perhaps even dominant in setting monetary policy, but it does not typically influence the formation of policy in other areas (except by spillover). By contrast, a monarch, religious leader, or military leader may reach into diverse areas of policy. It is the latter that concerns us.

Our experience with the first 96 countries tells us that classification of leaders has not been a particular problem for coders. For example, for those countries where the principal investigators have substantial experience, coder decisions corresponded with PI judgments.

Questionnaire

The data contained in GLP is gathered primarily from a lengthy questionnaire filled out by country

experts and included as Appendix A in this proposal. Responses are in English, though fields for alternate names in local languages are included for some answers.

Several questions pertain to country characteristics (e.g., the number and names of prominent ethnic groups). The rest pertain to individual characteristics of leaders – age, marital status, ethnicity, religion, native language, additional languages spoken, place of birth, previous job experience, previous political experience, highest level of education attainment, universities attended, principal course of study, party affiliation, current position, tenure of service, and so forth.

Questions were chosen for inclusion based on (a) potential relevance to problems of governance and (b) data availability. Most of the questions are factual in nature and can be coded on the basis of publicly available information (often contained in government web sites or CVs). A few questions (such as the coding of the most powerful individuals in a country) require coders to exercise judgment. For these questions, we can anticipate some degree of disagreement among scholars of a particular country. One expert's top-ten may not agree entirely with another expert's top-ten. However, we anticipate that top-ten lists coded by different country experts would be in agreement in most respects, which is to say that there would be agreement on most of the names on the list and that those in which there is disagreement would be close to inclusion on both lists (even if they make only one list).³

Thus far in the project, coders have been able to find the necessary information, without extreme effort, for nearly all questions and most countries. As with the identification of leaders discussed above, the remaining countries may pose greater difficulty in gathering data. However, we anticipate that data will be available for most questions and for the vast majority of the un-studied 74 countries. We have also allocated higher payments for coders than for the already-coded countries, in anticipation of the possibility that information in these countries may be slightly more difficult to obtain.

Research projects

This proposal asks for funds only for the completion of the database. However, the principal investigators are committed to using these data in a number of research projects. In this section, we briefly outline our plans, though we emphasize that the uses of these data extend far beyond the agenda we set out here.

I. Descriptive representation. A growing literature argues that public policies should be affected by the ascriptive characteristics of leaders. Much of this work is focused on India, where scholars have asked whether gender and caste reservations (e.g., reserving for women or members of scheduled castes the executive position in Panchayats) have led to changes in the provision of local public goods. Some work also shows that countries with more female legislators are less corrupt. All of this work is partial, however, in the sense that the share of all leadership positions controlled by women or minorities is unknown. At the same time, while the India work has emphasized the exogeneity of female or scheduled caste control of certain leadership positions, the relevant question in the vast majority of settings is to why women or minorities or other groups get representation at all. We will assemble a measure of how representative leadership ranks are of society; test some explanations of variations across countries in this measure; and, more tentatively, revisit earlier research that examines national public policies as a function of diversity in the ascriptive characteristics of leaders.

Work conducted on these issues has been focused on women, a category that is fairly easy to

³ We plan to construct limited tests of inter-coder reliability in the future by enlisting multiple experts to code several speculative questions of this nature for the same country.

code (Wangnerud 2009), or on ethnic groups among a small to middling number of countries, with no pretension of representing the world (Reynolds 2011; Ruedin 2009). There has been no attempt to systematically measure the political representation of ethnocultural groups on a global scale, as we aim to do.

GLP's coding of individual elites will be aggregated to national levels by comparing a group's share of the general population (P_i) with its share of elite positions (R_i), using the following formula (Ruedin 2009) $1 - 1/2 \sum |P_i - R_i|$ - to be calculated separately for groups defined by (1) ethnicity, (2) language, and (3) religion, and then combined in a summary score.

Another method of gauging representativeness builds on information about elites' place of birth. In a highly representative polity we would expect the hometowns of elites to mirror those of the general population; in a less representative system leadership positions will cluster in a specific region or regions. Given the wealth of geo-referenced data from sources like www.geonames.org, matching a leader's hometown to a specific geo-referenced point is a straightforward process. For cross-country analyses, summary statistics from point-process models could be used to create objective measures of the geographic representativeness of the leadership.

A third method of gauging representativeness builds on information contained in names. Using the method developed in Harris (2011), data on elite names at the country level could be used to estimate the ethnic/religious composition of the elite. These estimates (at the elite level) could then be compared with known or estimated percentages of the ethnic/religious composition of the society as a whole. Asymmetry between the elite composition and the population composition could be indicative of the representativeness of the government.

II. Education. Levels of educational attainment may be regarded as a proxy for the quality of public officials (Besley, Reynal-Querol 2011; Besley, Montalvo, Reynal-Querol forthcoming). This is so (a) because education contributes to training and perhaps to overall intelligence and capabilities, (b) because education rewards intelligence and ambition (even if it does not add greatly to either one) and therefore serves as a marker of capabilities, (c) because higher education confers prestige and those without it may suffer from lower self-esteem and less power in the playing field of politics, and (d) because public officials with little education often receive their positions through patronage networks. For all of these reasons (which, thankfully, we need not sort out), the quality of government officials should be reflected in the degree of education among its top officials.

GLP measures the highest level of educational attainment for all elites, classified as: (a) primary, (b) secondary, (c) higher education non-university, (d) university/college, (e) post-graduate, or (f) Ph.D. We also rank the quality of the educational institution at which the highest degree was completed, following Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), known as the Shanghai Ranking. This allows us to measure the degree of education obtained by elites across countries in two ways (which may at some point be combined into a single measure but which will be tested separately as well).

Brief inventory of other possible analyses

The GLP will permit new or improved analyses of the relationship between leader qualities and development outcomes along many dimensions. This section offers a few examples.

I. Do formal or informal political checks and balances matter more for reform and credible commitment? A large literature investigates the hypothesis that political checks and balances (multiple veto players) are an obstacle to reform (too many actors can veto reform proposals) and that government commitments are more credible when backed up by political checks and balances. Existing measures, however, rely

on counting the number of formal actors in the system (the number of parties in the legislature, the relative power of the legislature and executive, etc.). The GLP allows two additional features of checks and balances to be investigated. First, informal leaders will be coded - those outside the formal constitutional system, but with the possibility of effectively blocking reform. Second, the commonality of veto player interests can be investigated through questions about leaders' place of birth, occupational background, education, course of study, religion, ethnicity, etc. Moreover, because leaders' names will be known, researchers will be able to make inferences about family ties, using last names. Where these are diverse, reform may be slow even when formal checks and balances are few; where these are homogeneous, reform may be rapid, even when formal checks are numerous.

II. *Is there educational heterogeneity among leaders and, if there is, does the education of the president matter less for the quality of public policy in environments where lower-level leaders are more educated?* This gets directly at a question that is the subject of the growing literature mentioned earlier. The questionnaire identifies the school that the leaders attended and the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) allows different universities to be ranked. Moreover, since the questionnaire will extract information on academic discipline, researchers will be able to distinguish the differential effects of technical and non-technical educational backgrounds (for example) on the reform choices of leaders.

III. *Do private experiences influence leaders' preferences over public policy?* Leaders with broader geographic, linguistic and professional experience might care more about reforms that benefit broad groups of citizens; they might have more personal experience with the effects of reform failure and success; and they might be less uncertain about those effects.

IV. *Do leaders learn from reform experiences elsewhere?* Related to III, research in this area hypothesizes that leaders with more international experience are more likely to learn from and be influenced by the reform efforts of other countries. Currently, there are no data on leader characteristics that bear on this question. The GLP includes at least four relevant questions (language, location of post-secondary education, birth at home or abroad, and participation in international organizations).

All of these are important questions for which practically no data exist. Granted, more robust answers will be possible once multiple years of GLP data have accrued. Even so, the cross-section we are currently completing offers an enormous step forward. Note also that because GLP collects data at the individual level across a wide range of social and political dimensions it offers the possibility of aggregating the data at many different levels – (a) social groups (defined by ethnicity, language, and/or religion), (b) political parties, (c) institutions (executive, legislative, judicial), (d) position (apex, top ten, executive, cabinet, executive staff, party leaders, assembly leaders, supreme court justices, back-benchers, and unelected persons), and of course (e) country. For many purposes, analysis at the sub-national level is more informative, and less prone to problems of identification, than analysis at the country level – especially where country fixed-effects can be enlisted.

Plan of work and request for funding

The GLP database has been built in four stages. First, a questionnaire (see Appendix A) was constructed, as discussed in the first section of this proposal.

Second, a web-based database was constructed using Drupal, a popular open-source Content Management Software (CMS). Drupal uses MySQL as its database engine. This system provides the user-interface for coders to enter data and for end-users view them on the website and download

data if preferred. Data queries may be restricted to particular countries or parameters. See <http://globalleadershipproject.org/>

Third, a sample of 170 countries was identified, including all sovereign and semisovereign territories with over a half-million inhabitants (along with a few that fall slightly below that threshold but which were judged important for other reasons such as Cape Verde, Djibouti, and Malta). See Appendix B.

Fourth, potential coders for these countries were identified. These country experts are generally academics, graduate students, or professionals involved in some aspect of politics (e.g., the civil service or an NGO). Since the questions of interest to this project are mostly factual – and the non-factual questions do not have a pronounced partisan or ideological slant – we decided to minimize time and expense by recruiting only one coder per country.

Coders were remunerated according to the number of elites and the ease of data access in that country. Experts coding countries with a very large class of elites such as China qualified for payments of up to \$750, while coders of countries with small elites were paid as little as \$300. This is on par with payments provided by Freedom House, and somewhat less than that provided by Bertelsmann, so far as we know. In any case, given the time required – roughly 60-70 hours for an average country (with 250-300 political elites) – it is a very modest sum. We feel fortunate to have been able to recruit such highly qualified people to work so hard for such minimal compensation.

Naturally, it was easier finding qualified experts for some countries than for others. As a region, Africa posed the biggest obstacle, perhaps because the number of qualified experts is small for many African countries – and also, we suspect, because experts expect to be remunerated at a higher rate than in other countries. For some experts, work of this nature is regarded as a job rather than a scholarly task; it is what they rely on to support themselves and their families. Our initial budget was clearly insufficient for providing this level of support.

Going forward, we anticipate spending an average of \$600 per coder. The “easy” countries have already been coded and the remaining countries will require a higher level of compensation to motivate experts to do their work, and to do it well.

Coding began in June 2010 and will finish, we hope, in early 2012. Each coding represents a snapshot of a country’s elite at the time the survey is completed. Naturally, there are worries about making comparisons across countries at different points in time. However, the time-window is relatively brief and fundamental changes in a country’s political elite are likely to materialize over much longer periods. Consequently, we feel it is reasonable to regard cross-country comparisons in this first round of GLP as cross-sectional in nature.

We have currently completed surveys for 96 countries spread throughout the world (see Appendix B). For each country, a small number of country-level variables are coded (either by experts or by consultation of secondary sources); these pertain to political parties, movements, political offices, languages, ethnicities, ethnocultural identities, and so forth (see Appendix A). The rest of the questionnaire focuses on individual leaders – an average of 302 per country. For each of these elites a series of 32 questions is posed (see Appendix A). This generates an individual-level dataset comprising 29,066 leaders and 930,112 matrix cells – though missing data for some of these questions reduces the dataset to roughly 726,650 matrix cells.

This is a substantial sample. However, it does not encompass the entire world of nation-states and is by no means representative of that population. For GLP to be fully functional it is essential to scale up the project to include the remaining 74 sizeable countries in the world (those over ½ million in population). This will require roughly \$44,000 in coder compensation (74 * \$600/coder).

It is also essential to have a well maintained website that users can easily access and download data. We can further develop the website by: (1) migrating it to a dedicated server, (2)

creating a map-based interactive user interface, (3) security enhancements, (4) page load optimization, and (5) database extensions. This website development will require roughly \$7,500.

The total budget for completing the final stage of the Global Leadership Project is thus \$51,500. All additional costs will be borne by the project team.

Budget

Already allocated

Coder payments:	\$55,500
Web developer:	\$5,000
<u>Research Assistant (Tuition and Stipend):</u>	<u>\$23,000</u>
Total:	\$83,500

Sources: The Clinton Global Initiative at Boston University, The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future at Boston University, and ??

Requested

Coder compensation:	\$44,000
<u>Website development:</u>	<u>\$ 7,500</u>
TOTAL	\$51,500

References

- Ahlquist, John; Margaret Levi. 2011. "Leadership: What It Means, What It Does, and What We Want to Know About It." *Annual Review of Political Science* 14.
- Alesina, Alberto; Eliana La Ferrara. 2005. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance." *Journal of Economic Literature* 43: September, 762-800.
- Alexiadou, Despina. 2011. *When Ministers Matter*. Book manuscript: University of Pittsburgh.
- Arel-Bundocky, Vincent; Walter R. Mebane, Jr. 2011. "Measurement Error, Missing Values and Latent Structure in Governance Indicators." Presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Seattle WA.
- Barnard, CI. 1938. *The Functions of the Executive*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Berlinski, Samuel; Torun Dewan; Keith Dowding. 2010. *Acting for Ministers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Besley, Timothy; Marta Reynal-Querol. 2011. "Do Democracies Select More Educated Leaders?" *American Political Science Review* 105:3, 552-566.
- Besley, Timothy; Jose Montalvo; Marta Reynal-Querol. Forthcoming. "Do Educated Leaders Matter for Growth?" *Economic Journal*.
- Best, Heinrich; Maurizio Cotta (eds). 2000. *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848-2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bienen, Henry; Nicolas van de Walle. 1991. *Of Time and Power: Leadership Duration in the Modern World*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Blau PM. 1955. *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press. Revised ed.
- Blondel, Jean. 1987. *Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis*. London: Sage Publications.
- Borchert, Jens; Jurgen Zeiss (eds). 2004. *The Political Class in Advanced Democracies: A Comparative in Handbook*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bunce, Valerie. 1981. *Do New Leaders Make a Difference? Executive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Chattopadhyay R, Duflo Esther. 2004. "Women as Policymakers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India." *Econometrica* 72:5, 1409-43.
- Cotta, Maurizio; Heinrich Best (eds). 2007. *Democratic Representation in Europe: Diversity, Change, and Convergence*. Oxford: Oxford University.
- Dogan, Mattei (ed). 2003. *Elite Configurations At The Apex of Power*. Leiden: Brill.
- Dowding, Keith; Patrick Dumont (eds). 2009. *The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing*. London: Routledge.
- Easterly, William; Ross Levine. 1997. "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(4): 1203-50.
- Elgie, Robert. 1995. *Political Leadership in Liberal Democracies*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Enticott, Gareth; George A. Boyne; Richard M. Walker. 2008. "The Use of Multiple Informants in Public Administration Research: Data Aggregation Using Organizational Echelons." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 19, 229-53.
- Faccio, Mara. 2006. "Politically Connected Firms." *American Economic Review* 96:1 (March) 369-86.
- Goemans, Hein E.; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch; Giacomo Chiozza. 2009. "Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders." *Journal of Peace Research* 46:2, 269-83.
- Grindle, Merilee. 2007. "Good Enough Governance Revisited." *Development Policy Review* 25:553-74.
- Habyarimana, James; Macartan Humphreys; Daniel N. Posner; Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101: 709-25.
- Hellman, Joel S. 1998. "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist

- Transitions.” *World Politics* 50:2, 203-34.
- Higley, John; Jan Pakulski. 2007. “Elite and Leadership Change in Liberal Democracies” *Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 6. Nos. 1-2. 6-26.
- Horowitz, Michael; Allan Stam. 2010. “Does Where You Stand Depend On If You Served: Military Service and International Conflict.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL (April).
- Humphreys, Macartan; William A. Masters; Martin E. Sandbu. 2006. “The Role of Leaders in Democratic Deliberations: Results from a Field Experiment in Sao Tome and Principe.” *World Politics* 58 (July) 583-622.
- Jones, Benjamin F.; Benjamin A. Olken. 2005. “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since World War II.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120:3 (August) 835-64.
- Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay; Massimo Mastruzzi. 2007. “Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006.” Washington: World Bank.
- Knoke, David. 1990. *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Morrison, Kevin M. 2011. “When Public Goods Go Bad: The Implications of the End of the Washington Consensus for the Study of Economic Reform.” *Comparative Politics* 44:1, 105-22.
- Mouritzen, Poul Erik, James H. Svava. 2002. *Leadership at the Apex: Politicians and Administrators in Western Governments*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Norris, Pippa (ed). 1997. *Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1976. *Comparative Study of Political Elites*. Prentice Hall.
- Riker, W. 1986. *The Art of Political Manipulation*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
- Reynolds, Andrew. 2011. *Designing Democracy in a Dangerous World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Roeder, Philip G. 1985. “Do New Soviet Leaders Really Make a Difference? Rethinking the ‘Succession Connection.’” *American Political Science Review* 79:4 (December) 958-76.
- Ruedin, Didier. 2009. “Ethnic Group Representation in a Cross-National Comparison.” *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 15: 4, 335 -354.
- Samatar, Abdi Ismail. 1997. “Leadership and Ethnicity in the Making of African State Models: Botswana and Somalia.” *Third World Quarterly* 18:4, 687-707.
- Samuels, Richard J. 2003. *Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Selznick, Philip. 1957. *Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Thomas, M.A. 2010. “What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure?” *European Journal of Development Research* 22, 31-54.
- Wängnerud, L. 2009. “Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation.” *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12:51-69.

Appendix A:
Questionnaire

Explanatory notes

Additional fields. For most of the following questions (except the most obvious), three additional fields will be available:

- a) *Uncertain.* If checked, this means that the coder is uncertain about the answer to this question. Default: unchecked. (We may try to factcheck those items marked uncertain, or try to consult other experts.) Evidently, certainty will be greater for some questions (e.g., sex) than for others (e.g., political power). However, in checking the Uncertainty box we are asking for an estimate relative to other answers to *that particular question*. Thus, if a coder is more uncertain about one person's level of power, relative to other persons' political power, the coder should register this uncertainty by checking the appropriate box.
- b) *Assumed.* If checked, the answer to the question is inferred, rather than based on source material. Default: unchecked.
- c) *Notes.* An open-ended field that offers space (lots of space) for coders to comment on any aspect of a question. This includes problems pertaining to the coding. Here, the coder can explain why s/he checked the *Uncertain* box. S/he can also describe special sources (published or unpublished) used to code that question and any additional persons consulted. If someone other than the principal coder enters data for an entry, or changes that entry, this should be noted here.

Unanswered questions. If questions are left unanswered, it is assumed that the information could not be obtained.

SEDEPE. A few coding categories are adopted from the SEDEPE codebook, as designated below. (http://sedepe.net/?page_id=169)

Defining categories. A number of the questions require the coder to define a category, e.g., family/clan, a region, religion, or ethnic/racial/cultural group. The coder will be asked to use whatever categories are common in the country, making sure that the terminology is consistent through the questionnaire.

Likewise, where party groupings are indistinct, the coder must make a judgment about which party groupings are real and which are artificial. For example, it is traditional to code the German CDU and CSU as the same party. Likewise, some independents in the US Senate are perhaps better coded as members of one of the major parties. We leave this to the coder's discretion. However, it is important to note any such coding decisions so that future users of the data can make sense of them. (One potential use of the Notes field.)

Coder

Name:

Position:

Email:

Dates

Date of completion: (day/month/year) (00/00/0000) Refers to date that the answers to the following questions most accurately reflect. In most circumstances, the appropriate date is the day that the questionnaire is completed. However, if the questionnaire is filled out in August but most of the evidence is from March, the latter should be entered as the date.

Date of most recent presidential election (if any): (day/month/year) (00/00/0000)

Date of most recent national legislative election: (day/month/year) (00/00/0000)

Country

Refers to a polity that is sovereign or semisovereign (e.g., Hong Kong).

Country name (English):

Country name (English, alternate):

Country code (SEDEPE):

Country code (Banks):

Country code (WDI):

Ethnicity

List all salient ethnocultural groups (ethnic, religious, linguistic). Salient means politically, socially, or culturally significant – regardless of size. For each group, note:

- a) Total population (raw number):
- b) Percent of total population in the country:
- c) An ethnic designation: Y/N
- d) A linguistic designation: Y/N
- e) A religious designation: Y/N

1. Which description best characterizes the location of this ethnic group within the country

Are most members of this group: (a) living in one area? if yes, where?; (b) living together but in different places?; (c) living diffusely across country?

2. Rank all social (ethnocultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic) groups according to their average economic status in a given country.

Legislature

Note: All questions pertaining to “assemblies” in the following survey are assumed to refer to the legislative/consultative body listed here.

If unicameral, list the name of the legislature:

If bicameral, list the name of the more powerful house or (if equal in power) the lower house:

If no legislature (in the usual sense), list the preeminent unelected consultative body:

Parties

List all political parties with seats in the national legislature (most powerful house, if bicameral; both houses if symmetrical in power)

For each party, list the ethnocultural group or groups that it is identified with (i.e., its social base), if any

Influentials

These are persons who, in the judgment of the coder, possess the greatest overall political influence in a country. Their power may be formal or informal. May include the executive(s), the power behind the throne, holders of the most powerful offices, or unelected persons (e.g., a media patron, religious leader, military leader).

- a) Apex.* The 1 or 2 most powerful people in a country (ranked). Note that sometimes there is a single most powerful person (e.g., president). At other times, there are two people of roughly equal power (e.g., a president and prime minister). The coder must therefore choose to list one or two persons, according to the setting.
- b) Top ten:* The next ten most powerful persons, after those at the apex (unranked).

Officeholders

Identify the holders of these offices:

1. *Executive.* The person or persons who administers the executive branch agencies (the person to whom agency chiefs report). Typically, this is a president or prime minister. Note that in some polities this person takes orders or pays obeisance to an unelected official, e.g., a monarch, military ruler, or religious figure. In designating the executive you are not making any claims about the executive’s de facto authority but merely his/her de jure authority. Occasionally, the executive is truly collegial, as in Switzerland. However, in most parliamentary systems there is a

single “prime” minister or chancellor who is primus inter pares (and who should therefore be designated as the executive). The single executive or most powerful person in executive position.

2. *Cabinet/Ministers*. Ministers (including ministers without portfolio).

Ministerial Policy Area:

- a) First (most important), if more than one [SEDEPE]
- b) Ministerial policy area – second, if more than one
- c) Ministerial policy area – third, if more than two

- 1 PM or equivalent
- 2 Vice or deputy PM
- 3 without portfolio
- 4 finance / treasury / budget
- 5 economy
- 6 justice
- 7 foreign affairs
- 8 defence
- 9 interior
- 10 agriculture
- 11 fisheries, sea
- 12 industry
- 13 commerce
- 14 social affairs
- 15 health
- 16 labour, employment
- 17 family, youth
- 18 transport
- 19 construction, housing, urbanization
- 20 environment
- 21 research, technology
- 22 culture
- 23 foreign trade
- 24 posts, telecommunications
- 25 sports
- 26 foreign aid
- 27 civil service
- 28 public works
- 29 energy
- 30 planning, land management
- 31 regional affairs
- 32 war veterans, refugees and repatriation
- 33 relations with parliament
- 34 education
- 35 information
- 36 leisure, tourism
- 37 consumer affairs
- 38 food
- 39 women (gender–equal opportunities?)

40	European affairs
41	other
99	not known

3. *Executive staff.* Important members of the executive (president and/or prime minister) who serve in an advisory capacity but are not cabinet members, ministers, or MPs.
Policy area:
 - a) General (non-specific)
 - b) Economy/finance/budget
 - c) Other domestic
 - d) Foreign/defense
4. *Party leaders.* Leaders of all parties seated in the assembly (they may or may not hold a seat in the assembly or some official position in government).
5. *Assembly leaders.* Tentatively, this includes all those with official party and legislative positions (e.g., the speaker, caucus leaders, whips, committee chairs, but not subcommittee chairs).
6. *Assembly backbenchers/MPs.* All those in the assembly not designated as leaders (above).
7. *Supreme court.* Members of the top court or constitutional court (that which has jurisdiction over constitutional issues).
8. *Other unelected bodies.* Unelected persons (e.g., a monarch, religious leader, military leader or junta) who exert influence over a range of policy issues (not just a specialized issue-area). The breadth of influence is important here. For example, a central bank may be influential (perhaps even dominant) in setting monetary policy, but it does not typically influence the formation of policy in other areas (except by spillover). By contrast, a monarch, religious leader, or military leader may reach into diverse areas of policy. In this respect, and to the extent that they are able to influence these other policy areas, they are rightly considered as key political elites within a polity.

Other questions applied to each officeholder listed above...

1. Office Position (English)
2. Office Position (local language)
3. Year in which service in current position began (this is the date on which the person assumed office, not the date of election or appointment)
4. Is the person among the most powerful people in a country?
 - a) *Apex* (check if yes)
 - b) *Top ten* (check if yes)
5. Non-political occupation (prior or concurrent with current political post: [SEDEPE])
 - a) no (previous) occupation (including unemployed)

- b) self-employed: professional (accountant, architect, lawyer, medical doctor etc.)
- c) self-employed: small businessman
- d) self-employed: farmer, fisherman
- e) employed: professional (accountant, architect, lawyer, medical doctor etc.)
- f) employed: middle management (department head, technician etc.)
- g) employed: top management / director / CEO
- h) employed: other white-collar worker
- i) employed: blue-collar worker
- j) education: school teacher
- k) education: university professor
- l) full-time politician (paid by party organisation, parliament, government; think tanks; living of politics)
- m) full-time interest group official (trade union)
- n) full-time interest group official (employers' association)
- o) International organization top management
- p) International organization other
- q) Unemployed
- r) Military Officer
- s) Media (Pundit, journalist, columnist, etc...)
- t) Landlord
- u) other

6. Political experience:

- a) national trade union
- b) national employers organization
- c) national other interest group
- d) supra-national trade union
- e) supra-national employers organization
- f) supra-national other interest group
- g) governmental international organization
- h) NGO
- i) Local government
- j) Municipal position
- k) Party youth branch
- l) Political movement
- m) None

7. Highest level of education completed:

- a) primary
- b) secondary
- c) higher education non university
- d) university / college
- e) post-graduate (anything except Ph.D. degree)
- f) Ph.D.

8. List all post-secondary colleges/universities attended:

9. Name and Locations (city/country) of college/university:

10. Principal course of study: [SEDEPE] (undergraduate degree)
 - a) agronomy
 - b) economics / business / management
 - c) engineering
 - d) mathematics / computer science
 - e) biology / chemistry / physics
 - f) humanities
 - g) social sciences
 - h) law
 - i) medicine
 - j) military
 - k) other
11. Course of study for the person's highest degree (if different than undergraduate degree)
12. Year of birth: (day/month/year) (00/00/0000)
13. Sex: (M/F)
14. Party affiliation (English)
15. Party affiliation (local language)
16. Position in party, if significant (English)
17. Position in party, if significant (local language)
18. Coalition affiliation (if different from the previous).
19. Member of, or closely allied to, the current ruling party or coalition (Y/N).
20. Nonpartisan (Y/N). This may be inferred if partisanship is very difficult to obtain. What we are interested in is a person's *official* partisanship; if s/he chooses to keep this secret, s/he should be classified as nonpartisan.
21. Linked by birth or marriage to a prominent family or clan (Y/N).
22. If yes, list the family or clan name.
23. Place of birth (i.e., location in which family was residing when person was born):
24. Born abroad: (Y/N)
25. Marital Status: (Married/Single/Divorced)
26. Place of long-term affiliation or current political base:

27. Native language
28. Additional languages spoken
29. Religion of family (birth): (Options include “none” and “none apparent.”)
30. Current religion and sect: (Options include “none”, “atheist” and “agnostic.”)
31. Ethnic/ethnocultural affiliation
32. The criteria to determine one’s ethnic/ethnocultural identity:
 - Birth place
 - Skin color
 - Language
 - Name
 - Family background
 - Religion
 - Education
 - Self-proclamation/Official Statement
 - Interaction with "in-group" members
 - Participation in group- related activity
 - Secondary Sources
 - Political discourse
 - Political Base
 - Political Party membership
 - Other

Appendix B:

Countries in the Sample

Africa			
<i>Complete (12)</i>		<i>Incomplete (35)</i>	
Cameroon	Angola	Djibouti	Malawi
Kenya	Benin	Equatorial Guinea	Mauritius
Liberia	Botswana	Eritrea	Niger
Mali	Burkina Faso	Ethiopia	Rwanda
Mauritania	Burundi	Gabon	Sierra Leone
Mozambique	Cape Verde	Gambia	Somalia
Namibia	CAR	Ghana	South Africa
Nigeria	Chad	Guinea	Sudan
Senegal	Comoros	Guinea-Bissau	Swaziland
Tanzania	Congo (DRC)	Lesotho	Togo
Uganda	Congo (Republic)	Libya	Zambia
Zimbabwe	Cote d'Ivoire	Madagascar	

East, Southeast Asia		
<i>Complete (12)</i>		<i>Incomplete (3)</i>
China	Philippines	Cambodia
Indonesia	Singapore	Laos
Japan	South Korea	Mongolia
Malaysia	Taiwan	
Myanmar	Thailand	
North Korea	Viet Nam	

Central Asia/Russia		
<i>Complete (7)</i>		<i>Incomplete (3)</i>
Afghanistan	Kyrgyzstan	Kazakhstan
Armenia	Russian Federation	Tajikistan
Azerbaijan	Uzbekistan	Turkmenistan
Georgia		

South Asia

Complete (2)

Myanmar
Pakistan

Incomplete (4)

Bangladesh
India
Nepal
Sri Lanka

Middle East/North Africa

Complete (11)

Algeria
Cyprus (Turkey)
Egypt
Iran
Israel
Morocco
Palestinian Territory
Saudi Arabia
Tunisia
Turkey
Yemen

Incomplete (11)

Bahrain
Cyprus
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syria
United Arab Emirates

Americas

Complete (17)

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana

Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Peru
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela

Incomplete (10)

Belize
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Haiti
Jamaica
Panama
Paraguay
Puerto Rico
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago

Europe (West and East)

Complete (33)

Austria	Germany	Moldova
Belarus	Greece	Montenegro
Belgium	Hungary	Netherlands
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Iceland	Poland
Bulgaria	Ireland	Portugal
Croatia	Italy	Romania
Czech Republic	Kosovo	Serbia
Denmark	Latvia	Sweden
Estonia	Lithuania	Switzerland
Finland	Luxembourg	Ukraine
France	Macedonia	United Kingdom

Incomplete (6)

Albania
Malta
Norway
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain

Oceania

Complete (2)

Australia
New Zealand

Incomplete (2)

Fiji
Papua New Guinea